Rare Earth Stocks: What the 10-Q Actually Says About USAR, MP, UUUU, NB, and PPTA
Five US-listed rare earth and critical minerals companies hold a combined ~$16 billion market cap. We computed cash runway, dilution velocity, and project funding gaps from their latest 10-Q XBRL data — then cross-referenced every government funding headline against what the SEC filings actually disclose. Key findings: NioCorp is 27% funded for the $1.14B Elk Creek Project with an EXIM timeline they 'cannot estimate.' Perpetua is 32% funded for a $2.2B project facing two federal lawsuits. NB shareholders have been diluted 210% from baseline. MP Materials is the only company with binding customer contracts and government price protection — but it's still burning $230M per year in free cash flow.
Rare Earth Stocks: What the 10-Q Actually Says
Published: February 8, 2026 Data Currency: SEC XBRL filings (10-Q) processed through February 2026. Filing intelligence from MetricDuck's 5-pass analysis pipeline. Filings analyzed: USAR Q3 2025 (Sep 30), MP Q3 2025 (Sep 30), UUUU Q3 2025 (Sep 30), NB Q4 FY2025 (Dec 31), PPTA Q3 2025 (Sep 30).
Key Findings
We computed cash runway, dilution velocity, and project funding gaps from XBRL data for every investable US rare earth and critical minerals company:
- NioCorp is 27% funded for its $1.14B project. Perpetua is 32% funded for a $2.2B project. Both need EXIM Bank loans that aren't committed — NB says it's "unable to estimate" the timeline
- NioCorp (NB) shareholders have been diluted 210% from their 8-quarter baseline. USAR: 72%. PPTA: 60%. And the dilution isn't over — the companies that are 27-32% funded will need to raise billions more
- MP Materials is the only company with binding government contracts, named customers paying real money, and actual production. But MP is still burning $230M/year in free cash flow — a ~5-year cash runway even with $1.15B in the bank
- Energy Fuels (UUUU) sold 1.2 tonnes of NdPr in 9 months. MP produced 721 tonnes in Q3 alone — a ~1,800x quarterly production gap. UUUU says profits are "minimal until 2027-2028"
The Analytical Question
Five US-listed companies are racing to build rare earth and critical minerals supply chains independent of China. China controls approximately 69% of global rare earth mining and an estimated 90% of processing (USGS, 2024) — the strategic vulnerability driving this investment wave. Combined, these five companies hold roughly $16 billion in market capitalization. Trump's "Project Vault" ($12 billion critical minerals stockpile), China's export control whiplash, and unprecedented government equity stakes have sent the sector surging.
We read the latest 10-Q for each company — USA Rare Earth (USAR), MP Materials (MP), Energy Fuels (UUUU), NioCorp (NB), and Perpetua Resources (PPTA) — and computed what the XBRL financial data reveals about three questions:
- Funding reality: Is the capital actually committed, or are investors betting on press releases?
- Shareholder cost: How much have existing shareholders been diluted, and how much more dilution is coming?
- Production gap: Who is actually producing, and at what scale relative to peers?
The Funding Reality
The Funding Gap
The most important number for a pre-revenue mining company isn't ROIC — it's how much of the project is funded. We computed the funding gap for each company using cash on hand, committed external funding, and total project cost estimates from the filings:
| Company | Cash | Project Cost | Committed Funding | Unfunded Gap | % Funded |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MP | $1,148M | Self-funding | $150M DoW loan + $200M Apple + $47M GM YTD | Operating | Operating |
| PPTA | $720M* | $2,215M | $0 committed ($59.2M DPA grant exhausted) | $1,495M | 32% |
| NB | $306M | $1,141M | $0 committed (EXIM non-binding) | $835M | 27% |
| USAR | $258M | Undisclosed | $7M TIF | Unknown | Unknown |
| UUUU | $117M | Ongoing | No committed gov | Funded via dilution | Ongoing |
*PPTA: $139M locked as reclamation bond collateral, must maintain $200M minimum collateral
NioCorp and Perpetua are betting on EXIM Bank loans that don't exist yet. NB filed its application in June 2023, received a "preliminary, non-binding indicative term sheet" in April 2024, and says it's "unable to estimate how long the application process may take." PPTA's $2.0B EXIM facility has indicative terms but awaits Board consideration "by the spring of 2026." Both filings say the outcome is uncertain.
USAR is the outlier: its total project cost for the Stillwater magnet plant isn't disclosed in the 10-Q, the only government funding in the filing is a $7M local TIF deal, and the company carries a formal going concern warning. The $1.6B federal investment announced in February 2026 is post-quarter and non-binding.
Cash Runway
Cash runway at current burn rates is misleading for pre-construction companies — their burn will accelerate. We computed it anyway, then flagged what the filings say about future spending:
| Company | Cash | Quarterly FCF Burn | Runway at Current Rate | What the Filing Says About Future Burn |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MP | $1,148M | $57.5M | ~5.0 years | Has $232.7M TTM revenue. Burn may decrease as magnet manufacturing ramps — or increase if ramp takes "many quarters" |
| PPTA | $446M | $11.1M | ~10.0 years | Misleading: construction of a $2.2B project will spike burn 10-20x. The filing says they "do not currently have sufficient funds" |
| NB | $306M | $4.0M | ~19.0 years | Misleading: filing says planned outflows of $70-85M for the next 12 months. At that rate: ~3.9 years |
| USAR | $258M | $5.8M | ~11.0 years | Has a going concern warning — management expects burn to accelerate as Stillwater enters construction |
| UUUU | $117M | $27.3M | ~1.1 years | Has a $700M convertible note backstop. But if the stock falls below $20.34, those notes become debt, not equity |
The "what the filing says" column is where the real analysis lives. NB looks like it has 19 years of runway — until you read that the company itself plans $70-85M in outflows over the next year. PPTA looks comfortable at 10 years — until you realize $2.2B in construction spending hasn't started in earnest.
UUUU's position looks alarming at 1.1 years — but the $700M convertible notes provide a backstop. The risk is structural: if UUUU's stock price falls below the $20.34 conversion price, those notes don't convert to equity — they become a $700M debt obligation on a company with $117M in cash.
Is the Government Money Binding?
Every company in this sector references government support. But there's a critical distinction between committed, binding contracts and non-binding expressions of interest:
| Company | Headline | Filing Status | Binding? |
|---|---|---|---|
| MP | DoW partnership | $110/kg NdPr price floor for 10 years. $150M loan at 5.38%. DoW 15% equity stake. | Yes |
| USAR | $1.6B federal package | Not in Q3 filing. Only: $7M TIF deal. $1.6B is post-quarter, described as non-binding. | No |
| NB | $800M EXIM loan | Application filed June 2023. Non-binding term sheet. Timeline "unable to estimate." | No |
| PPTA | $2B EXIM loan | Indicative terms received. Board vote anticipated spring 2026. | No |
| UUUU | Mine-to-magnet leader | No government funding commitment in Q3 filing. | No |
The distinction matters: MP's government relationship is a customer contract with price protection, loan terms, and equity exchange. Everyone else's government relationship is a funding application — an expression of interest that may or may not convert to committed capital.
MP's DoW deal is worth quantifying: the $110/kg price floor ($110/kg ≈ $50/lb) means that if NdPr prices fall below that level, the DoW pays the difference. At MP's current NdPr production rate (~721 MT/quarter), the full price floor would protect roughly $79M in quarterly revenue. This isn't a subsidy — it's a put option on MP's core product, funded by the US government, for a decade.
The Shareholder Cost
When pre-revenue companies need capital, they issue shares. The investors who bought on headlines face dilution from the investors who are actually funding the operations. We computed dilution velocity by comparing current diluted share counts against the 8-quarter median baseline from our XBRL pipeline:
| Company | Current Shares (Diluted) | 8-Quarter Median | Dilution from Baseline | What This Means |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NB | 116.8M | 37.7M | +210% | Shares tripled. A pre-2024 shareholder now owns ~32% of their original stake. |
| USAR | 102.6M | 59.5M | +72% | And the filing says they "will still need to raise additional capital" |
| PPTA | 107.0M | 66.9M | +60% | Needs $1.5B more — significant further dilution is likely |
| UUUU | 232.7M | 180.7M | +29% | Plus $700M convertibles at $20.34 = another 34.4M shares if converted |
| MP | 175.0M | 164.0M | +7% | Funded by operations and strategic partnerships, not pure equity issuance |
The Dilution Isn't Over
The connection between the funding gap table above and the dilution table here is the most important insight in this analysis. Companies that are 27-32% funded for their projects will dilute further — the question is by how much.
A rough estimate: NioCorp needs $835M more to fund Elk Creek. If raised at recent issuance prices (~$3/share based on equity placement data), that would require ~278 million additional shares — another 238% dilution on the current 117M share base. A pre-2024 NB shareholder who started at 37.7M shares outstanding could end up in a company with ~395M shares — owning roughly 10% of their original proportional stake.
PPTA's math is similar: $1.5B needed at ~$7/share implies ~214M additional shares on a 107M base — roughly 200% further dilution.
These aren't predictions — they're arithmetic based on recent issuance prices. Higher stock prices would reduce the share count needed; lower prices would increase it. But the direction is clear: companies that need billions and have no committed external funding will raise it from shareholders or fail.
Stock-Based Compensation Burn
Beyond equity raises, all five companies pay employees in stock. For pre-revenue companies, SBC burns cash reserves indirectly by expanding the share count:
| Company | SBC (Annualized) | As % of Cash | As % of Revenue |
|---|---|---|---|
| UUUU | $13.2M | 11.3% | 16.8% |
| USAR | $12.0M | 4.7% | No revenue |
| MP | $30.7M | 2.7% | 13.2% |
| NB | $3.1M | 1.0% | No revenue |
| PPTA | $3.4M | 0.8% | No revenue |
UUUU's SBC stands out: 11.3% of cash and 16.8% of revenue consumed by stock compensation. For a company with only $117M in cash and a 1.1-year runway (pre-convertible), this is a material drain. MP's absolute SBC is larger ($30.7M) but represents a smaller fraction of its $1.15B cash base.
The Production Gap
The question "when will they make money?" is what every article asks. A more useful question: who is actually producing, and at what scale?
| Company | Actual Rare Earth / Critical Mineral Production | Scale Context | Filing Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| MP | 721 MT NdPr in Q3 2025 (+51% YoY). Trial automotive-grade magnets. | Full-scale mining + separation. GM paying $47M YTD. | Magnet factory "targeted to enter service at end of 2025" but "may take many quarters" to reach designed throughput |
| UUUU | 1.2 tonnes NdPr in 9 months | MP produces ~1,800x more per quarter | "Profits minimal until 2027-2028". Heavy RE production Q4 2026 |
| PPTA | Early works construction started Oct 21, 2025 | Zero production | Two lawsuits seek to vacate permits and halt the project |
| USAR | Zero | Zero | "Not determined whether Round Top contains commercially exploitable quantities" |
| NB | Zero | Zero | Portal Project starting Q1 2026 at $44.6M — 4% of total project cost |
The ~1,800x Production Gap
The UUUU/MP comparison deserves scrutiny. Energy Fuels sold 1.2 tonnes of NdPr in nine months while burning $172M in cash. MP produced 721 metric tonnes of NdPr in Q3 2025 alone. On a quarterly basis, MP produces roughly 1,800 times more NdPr than UUUU (721 MT per quarter vs. ~0.4 tonnes per quarter).
Even with aggressive scale-up curves, that's an enormous gap. UUUU's filing says "profits from this initiative are expected to be minimal until...2027-2028" — but provides no intermediate production milestones between 1.2 tonnes and commercial scale. What does the ramp look like in Q1, Q2, Q3 of 2026? The filing doesn't say.
UUUU's filing does quantify one thing: the ex-China pricing premium. European NdPr, dysprosium, and terbium prices exceed Chinese prices by 13%, 276%, and 264% respectively. These premiums reflect the scarcity of non-Chinese supply. But a 276% premium on 0.4 tonnes per quarter of dysprosium is a rounding error in UUUU's financials. The premium becomes valuable only at commercial scale — which UUUU says is 2-3 years away.
UUUU's heavy rare earth production (dysprosium, terbium) is expected at commercial scale in Q4 2026. If achieved, that would make it the first US producer of heavy rare earths — a genuinely differentiated position. But the production evidence in the Q3 filing doesn't support the timeline's credibility.
PPTA: Defense Antimony Under Legal Threat
Perpetua Resources occupies a distinct niche: domestic production of military-grade antimony trisulfide for defense energetic materials. China controls 48% of antimony mining and ~90% of smelting — a genuine national security vulnerability. The Department of Defense interest is real: PPTA received a $59.2M DPA Title III grant (now exhausted).
But the execution path is blocked. Two federal lawsuits seek to vacate the Record of Decision and "enjoin any further implementation of the Project." A stipulation restricted construction activities until February 1, 2026. The company began early works construction on October 21, 2025 — but this is a $2.2B project with $720M in cash, no committed external financing, two pending lawsuits, and an exhausted DPA grant.
Risk Synthesis
The preceding three sections — funding, dilution, and production — converge into a three-dimensional risk picture. We assessed each company across all three dimensions using the filing evidence documented above:
| Company | Funding Risk | Execution Risk | Dilution Risk | Overall |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MP | Low — $1.15B cash, $500M+ prepayments, DoW price floor | Medium — magnet ramp "may take many quarters," FCF -$230M/yr | Low — 7% from baseline | Lowest — not risk-free |
| UUUU | Medium — $700M convertible backstop, no committed gov | High — 1.2 tonnes in 9 months, ~1,800x gap to MP | Medium-High — 29% + convertible overhang | Medium-high |
| PPTA | High — 32% funded, EXIM not committed, DPA exhausted | High — two lawsuits, $2.2B project, insufficient funds | Medium — 60%, more coming | High |
| NB | Very High — 27% funded, EXIM timeline unknown | Very High — zero production, material weakness, 4% of project spent | Very High — 210%, shares tripled | Highest |
| USAR | Very High — going concern, zero committed funding, unproven reserves | Very High — zero revenue, zero production | High — 72% from baseline | Highest |
MP Is Ahead — But "Lowest Risk" Isn't "Low Risk"
MP Materials deserves an honest assessment of both sides. The filing evidence clearly places it ahead of the group: it's the only company with actual revenue ($232.7M TTM), binding customer contracts (GM, Apple), a government price floor ($110/kg NdPr for 10 years), and production at commercial scale (721 MT NdPr in Q3).
But MP is still burning $230M per year in free cash flow. Its $1.15B cash reserve gives it roughly 5 years at current burn rates — which sounds comfortable until you consider that the Independence magnet factory was "targeted to enter service at the end of 2025" and the filing (dated September 30, 2025) says it "may take many quarters to achieve our designed throughput." If magnet manufacturing doesn't reach positive contribution margin within 2-3 years, MP's cash position erodes to concerning levels.
There's also a structural risk for common shareholders: the DoW partnership includes a Series A preferred stock with a $406M liquidation preference. In a downside scenario, the government gets paid first.
MP ceased all sales to China in July 2025 — a requirement of the DoW partnership. The filing is direct about the cost: the cessation had "a material negative impact on our business, operating results, financial performance and financial condition, cash flows and liquidity." Materials segment revenue dropped 50% year-over-year. The magnet factory has to fill that gap. It hasn't yet.
What Would Change This Picture
Each company has a specific milestone that would materially alter the risk assessment above. We ranked each by the filing evidence supporting or undermining its credibility:
| Company | Catalyst | Credibility | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| MP | Positive quarterly FCF | Medium-High | GM paying $47M YTD, Apple $200M committed, trial magnets running. But factory ramp "may take many quarters." |
| USAR | First commercial magnet from Stillwater | Low-Medium | Must commence by March 31, 2026 (contractual TIF deadline). But going concern + zero operating history. |
| PPTA | Lawsuits resolved + EXIM Board vote | Low-Medium | EXIM Board vote "spring 2026." But two lawsuits pending, DPA exhausted, $1.5B gap. |
| UUUU | Commercial-scale heavy RE production | Low | 1.2 tonnes in 9 months. 1,800x gap to MP's scale. Filing says 2027-2028 but no intermediate milestones. |
| NB | EXIM Bank final commitment | Low | Filed June 2023. Non-binding term sheet. "Unable to estimate" timeline. |
What This Analysis Cannot Tell You
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Government commitments evolve faster than 10-Q filings. USAR's $1.6B package, announced in February 2026, is not in the Q3 2025 filing. Trump's Project Vault ($12B) postdates all filings analyzed here. However, press releases are aspirational; SEC filings are legal. Management's risk disclosures and financial statements remain the most recent audited picture until the next 10-Q is filed.
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Pre-revenue ROIC is inherently negative for mining companies investing in development. We chose to analyze funding gaps, dilution velocity, and production scale instead of ROIC because those metrics answer questions that investors are actually asking. For reference: all five companies generate negative ROIC (USAR -30.9%, PPTA -29.5%, UUUU -18.9%, NB -15.9%, MP -6.3%).
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MP's magnet factory risk is material. The Q3 filing says the Independence facility was "targeted to enter service at end of 2025" and acknowledges it "may take many quarters to achieve designed throughput." MP's current favorable position depends on execution that hasn't happened yet. If magnet manufacturing fails to reach positive FCF within 2-3 years, MP faces its own cash crisis.
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UUUU's convertible note structure creates tail risk. If UUUU's stock declines below the $20.34 conversion price, the $700M in convertible notes may not convert to equity — remaining instead as a $700M debt obligation on a company with $117M cash. This scenario isn't remote; it's a function of stock price.
-
Commodity prices change everything. Rare earth prices, uranium prices, gold prices, and antimony prices significantly affect the financial viability of these projects. This analysis examines what the SEC filings disclose about funding, dilution, and execution risk — not commodity price forecasts.
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This analysis covers only US-listed companies with SEC filings. Major rare earth producers like Lynas Rare Earths (ASX: LYC) and Critical Metals Corp (CRML) are not included because they don't file 10-Qs.
Methodology and Dataset
Computed Metrics: Cash runway, dilution velocity, and funding gap percentages are computed from XBRL financial data extracted by MetricDuck's standardized pipeline. Formulas:
- Cash Runway = Cash & Equivalents / |Free Cash Flow TTM / 4|
- Dilution Velocity = (Diluted Shares Outstanding Q - Diluted Shares Outstanding 8Q Median) / 8Q Median
- Funding Gap = (Project Cost - Cash - Committed External Funding) / Project Cost
- SBC Burn Rate = (Stock-Based Compensation Q × 4) / Cash & Equivalents
Project costs are sourced from filing disclosures, not computed from XBRL.
Filing Intelligence: Qualitative analysis from MetricDuck's 5-pass filing intelligence pipeline, which extracts financial health scores (1-10), management tone, hidden liabilities, and risk landscape from 10-Q filings.
Filing Quote Links: All linked quotes point to the exact sentence in the original SEC filing using MetricDuck's filing viewer. Click any linked quote to see it highlighted in the full 10-Q context.
Data Coverage:
| Company | Filing Analyzed | Period | MetricDuck Pages |
|---|---|---|---|
| USAR | 10-Q (Sep 30, 2025) | Q3 2025 | Earnings, FI, Analysis, ROIC |
| MP | 10-Q (Sep 30, 2025) | Q3 2025 | Earnings, FI, Analysis, ROIC |
| UUUU | 10-Q (Sep 30, 2025) | Q3 2025 | Analysis, ROIC |
| NB | 10-Q (Dec 31, 2025) | Q4 FY2025 | Earnings, FI |
| PPTA | 10-Q (Sep 30, 2025) | Q3 2025 | FI, Analysis, ROIC |
Explore the Data
The financial data analyzed in this research powers MetricDuck's company analysis platform. Explore earnings, ROIC, and filing intelligence for each company:
- USA Rare Earth (USAR) Earnings | ROIC | Filing Intelligence | Analysis
- MP Materials (MP) Earnings | ROIC | Filing Intelligence | Analysis
- Energy Fuels (UUUU) Analysis | ROIC
- NioCorp (NB) Earnings | Filing Intelligence
- Perpetua Resources (PPTA) Filing Intelligence | Analysis | ROIC
Related Research:
- FCX vs SCCO: Why the Largest Copper Miner Earns the Lowest ROIC — How filing data reveals capital efficiency gaps in mining
- How 2,100+ SEC Filers Actually Report Revenue in XBRL — Revenue element fragmentation across public companies
Disclaimer
This analysis is for educational and informational purposes only. It does not constitute investment advice, and you should not rely on it as such.
Important considerations:
- This is a research analysis of XBRL financial data and 10-Q filings, not a recommendation to buy or sell any security
- Computed metrics (cash runway, dilution velocity, funding gap) use current-period data and may not reflect future burn rates, especially for pre-construction companies where capital expenditures will increase significantly
- Filing intelligence scores reflect automated analysis and should be verified against original filings
- Government funding status reflects what is disclosed in the analyzed SEC filings; subsequent announcements (including the February 2026 Project Vault) may change the picture
- Always verify financial data against original SEC filings on EDGAR
Conflict of Interest Disclosure: MetricDuck provides financial analysis tools that process SEC XBRL filings. This research demonstrates our data capabilities and domain expertise.
MetricDuck Research
SEC filing analysis and XBRL data extraction for fundamental investors