NEM, AEM, Barrick: The Company That's Shrinking Earns the Highest ROIC

Published: February 10, 2026 | Last reviewed: February 14, 2026 by MetricDuck Research Data Currency: SEC XBRL filings (10-Q, 40-F, 6-K) processed through February 2026. NEM ROIC computed from MetricDuck's standardized NOPAT/invested capital methodology (Q3 2025, September 30, 2025). Barrick data from FY2025 6-K (interim report filed by foreign companies, February 5, 2026). AEM data from FY2025 6-K (February 13, 2026). AISC from company-reported figures in annual filings and 6-K disclosures (not available in XBRL).

At record gold prices above $2,800 per ounce, gold mining companies are generating unprecedented cash flows. Unlike passive gold exposure through ETFs, miners must decide what to do with the windfall — and their choices reveal radically different bets on gold's future. This analysis compares the three largest Western gold producers on per-ounce economics, capital allocation, and jurisdiction risk using SEC filing data.

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Why Gold Miners, Not Gold ETFs

Gold ETFs (GLD, IAU) track the metal's price. Gold miners amplify it. The distinction matters at record prices.

Operational leverage is the mechanism. At $2,800 gold and $1,339/oz AISC (all-in sustaining costs — total cost to produce one ounce including mining, processing, sustaining capex, G&A, and royalties), AEM earns a $1,461/oz margin. A 10% gold price increase adds ~$280/oz to miner profits — the same price move adds ~$280 to a gold ETF's per-ounce NAV, but the miner's margin expands by 19%. This amplification works in both directions: at $1,500 gold, Barrick is below breakeven while GLD simply reflects a lower price.

Central bank demand creates a structural floor. Central banks purchased 863 tonnes of gold in 2025, well above the pre-2022 average of 400-500 tonnes per year. This buying — driven by reserve diversification after the 2022 freeze of Russian foreign assets — supports the gold price environment that makes miner economics work. Miners benefit from this floor through sustained margins.

Dividends and cash returns separate miners from ETFs. Gold ETFs pay nothing. AEM, Barrick, and Newmont collectively returned over $7.5 billion to shareholders in their most recent reporting periods — through dividends and buybacks. AEM has paid dividends every year since 1983.

The trade-off is operational risk. Barrick's Mali crisis cost ~$1.25 billion. Both AEM and Barrick saw AISC rise in FY2025 from cost inflation and higher royalties. Management can misallocate capital — history shows over $100 billion in shareholder value destroyed during the 2011-2015 gold cycle downturn. ETFs carry none of these risks, but they also offer no margin amplification, no dividends, and no capital allocation upside. The rest of this analysis provides the data to evaluate that trade-off.

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The Cost Curve: Per-Ounce Economics

Agnico Eagle produces gold at the lowest all-in sustaining cost among the three major Western gold miners. The gap is structural, not cyclical.

Metric	AEM (FY2025)	Barrick (FY2025)	NEM (est.)
AISC	$1,339/oz	$1,637/oz	~$1,500/oz
2026 Guidance	$1,400-1,550	$1,760-1,950	TBD
Margin at $2,800 Au	$1,461/oz	$1,163/oz	~$1,300/oz
Margin at $2,000 Au	$661/oz	$363/oz	~$500/oz
Breakeven gold price	~$1,339	~$1,637	~$1,500
Gold Production	3.45M oz (FY2025)	3.26M oz (FY2025)	~5.5M oz (est.)

NEM AISC note: Newmont does not report AISC in XBRL filings. Our estimate of ~$1,500/oz is derived from cost of applicable sales in the Q3 2025 10-Q divided by estimated gold production. NEM produces silver, copper, zinc, and lead alongside gold, which makes production-weighted AISC estimation imprecise. NEM reports its AISC in earnings releases and investor presentations, but not in the structured filing data our pipeline processes. We will update this estimate after NEM's Q4 2025 earnings on February 19.

Why AEM Costs $298 Less Per Ounce

The cost gap between AEM and Barrick is not one thing. It's the compounding effect of grade, geography, and portfolio composition.

Grade matters, but it's not the whole story. AEM's portfolio spans mines from 0.85 g/t (Detour Lake) to 15.55 g/t (Macassa). The high-grade mines — Fosterville at 8.96 g/t producing gold at $647/oz cash costs, Macassa at 15.55 g/t at $748/oz — pull the portfolio average down. Barrick's reserve grade averages 0.98 g/t across the company, meaning Barrick moves roughly 32 tonnes of rock per ounce of gold versus 3.5 tonnes at Fosterville.

But grade alone doesn't explain the gap. AEM's Detour Lake processes 0.85 g/t ore — lower than Barrick's average grade — yet reports cash costs of $796/oz (FY2024), well below Barrick's $1,637/oz AISC. What's different is jurisdiction: Detour Lake sits in northern Ontario with grid power, paved highways, and Canada's mining labor pool. Barrick's comparable operations in West Africa, the Dominican Republic, and Pakistan face diesel-dependent power, longer supply chains, and higher security costs.

AEM's mine-by-mine data (from FY2024 40-F):

Mine	Location	Production	Cash Costs/oz	Grade (g/t)
Detour Lake	Ontario, Canada	671,950 oz	$796	0.85
Canadian Malartic	Quebec, Canada	655,654 oz	$930	1.09
Meadowbank	Nunavut, Canada	504,719 oz	$938	4.18
Meliadine	Nunavut, Canada	378,886 oz	$940	6.22
LaRonde	Quebec, Canada	306,750 oz	$945	Varies
Macassa	Ontario, Canada	279,384 oz	$748	15.55
Fosterville	Victoria, Australia	225,203 oz	$647	8.96
Kittila	Finland	218,860 oz	$1,031	4.11
Goldex	Quebec, Canada	130,813 oz	$923	Varies

AEM's strategy is concentrated in politically stable and proven gold-producing regions. Nine of nine producing mines are in Canada, Australia, or Finland. Even AEM's highest-cost mine (Kittila at $1,031/oz in FY2024) is $606/oz cheaper than Barrick's FY2025 portfolio average.

What Happens When Gold Falls

The AISC gap determines who survives a price reversal. At $1,500 gold — roughly where prices were in 2019 — AEM retains $161/oz margin while Barrick is $137/oz below breakeven and NEM is approximately at breakeven:

Gold Price	AEM Margin	B Margin	NEM Margin (est.)
$2,800 (current)	$1,461	$1,163	~$1,300
$2,500	$1,161	$863	~$1,000
$2,000	$661	$363	~$500
$1,800	$461	$163	~$300
$1,500	$161	-$137	~$0

This is the table that matters at cycle peaks: who has cushion if the price reverts?

Key takeaway: AEM produces gold $298/oz cheaper than Barrick. At $1,500 gold, Barrick is below breakeven while AEM retains $161/oz margin.

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The Windfall Test: What Each Does with Record Cash Flow

At $2,800+ gold, the question is not whether these companies are profitable — at these prices, all of them are. The question is what each does with the windfall. Gold miners historically destroyed over $100 billion in shareholder value during the 2011-2015 gold cycle downturn through reckless M&A and over-investment. This cycle's capital allocation choices will determine the next decade of returns.

	NEM	Barrick	AEM
Windfall deployed to	Debt paydown ($3.9B)	Returns ($2.39B) + Capex (~$2.7-3.0B)	Returns ($1.4B) + Capex ($2.4B) + M&A ($5B+)
Strategy	Divest, deleverage, return	Copper growth + NA gold IPO + returns	Organic growth + safe-jurisdiction M&A
Risk profile	Low (derisking)	Medium-high (Reko Diq security review)	Medium (integration + capex)
If gold falls to $2,000	Deleveraging slows, but safe	Below breakeven at $1,500; projects at risk	Premiums look expensive; $161/oz cushion at $1,500

NEM: Cleaning Up a $26B Acquisition

Newmont's deleveraging is aggressive — but it's not voluntary discipline. It's the aftermath of the $26 billion Newcrest acquisition in 2023, the largest gold mining M&A in history. NEM overpaid at cycle peak, absorbed Newcrest's non-core assets, and is now divesting them.

The numbers show it working. NEM completed a debt tender offer that retired $3.9 billion in debt during 2025. Six non-core assets sold for $3.4 billion with $1.1 billion in gains. The result: NEM moved from net debt to net cash (-$492 million as of Q3 2025), with zero debt maturities through 2028.

Capital returned to shareholders reached $3.8 billion TTM (trailing twelve months) — dividends ($1.00/share, $1.1 billion) plus buybacks (2.84% yield). The capital return ratio hit 61.9% of free cash flow. By the numbers, this is the most aggressive shareholder return program in gold mining.

Barrick: From Pure Reinvestment to Balanced Returns

Barrick's FY2025 results reveal a company in transition. Under new CEO Mark Hill (who replaced Mark Bristow in September 2025), Barrick delivered record shareholder returns of $2.39 billion — $1.5 billion in buybacks plus $0.89 billion in dividends — while still funding growth projects. Free cash flow nearly tripled to $3.87 billion on $16.96 billion in revenue.

The capital allocation shift is notable. The quarterly dividend rose 40% to $0.175/share with a new 50% free cash flow payout target. This is a different Barrick from the one described in the FY2024 filing — the "reinvest first, return capital second" posture has moved toward balance.

Copper is the growth thesis — production hit 220,000 tonnes in FY2025 — while Fourmile in Nevada (2.6M oz at 17.59 g/t) anchors a planned IPO of North American gold assets targeted for late 2026. But Barrick's 6-K notes management is "currently reviewing all aspects" of Reko Diq in Pakistan due to increased security incidents. Mali was resolved in December 2025 (see below), removing one overhang — but 2026 capex of ~$2.67-$2.96 billion still flows into Pakistan and Zambia, jurisdictions where the Mali experience should weigh on investor confidence.

AEM: From Acquirer to Cash Machine

Agnico Eagle's FY2025 results reveal a company transitioning from acquisition mode to organic growth and capital returns. Record free cash flow of $4,399 million ($8.76/share) on record operating cash flow of $6,817 million funded $1.4 billion in shareholder returns, $2.1 billion in capital expenditures, and $318 million in exploration — all while building the net cash position to $2,670 million.

The M&A phase ($5+ billion over three years — Kirkland Lake Gold, Yamana, O3 Mining/Marban) concentrated production in tier-1 jurisdictions. Now those assets are generating returns. The quarterly dividend rose 12.5% to $0.45/share ($1.80 annually), extending a 42-year dividend streak. AEM repurchased 4.1 million shares for $600 million under its NCIB (Normal Course Issuer Bid — Canada's share buyback mechanism) and intends to renew the program.

The growth pipeline is now organic. Odyssey underground at Canadian Malartic is advancing ahead of schedule — East Gouldie production expected from the ramp in Q1 2026 and from the shaft in Q2 2027. Hope Bay has $102 million allocated for 2026 with a construction decision expected in Q2. At Detour Lake, the exploration ramp is advancing toward the West Extension zone. Management's long-term vision: production growing 20-30% over the next decade to exceed four million ounces by the early 2030s. Moody's upgraded AEM's credit rating to A3 Stable — the strongest balance sheet in its history.

The risk: AEM's 2026 AISC guidance of $1,400-$1,550/oz reflects ongoing cost inflation (approximately 60% from higher royalties and Canadian dollar, 40% from cost inflation). If gold falls to $2,000, the $661/oz margin cushion is comfortable but the M&A premiums look expensive in hindsight.

Key takeaway: NEM returned the most capital ($3.8B), Barrick shifted to balanced returns ($2.39B), AEM invested the most in organic growth while generating record $4.4B FCF.

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The Reserve Picture

Barrick holds the largest gold reserve base among Western miners — but that base is shrinking, and the growth pipeline carries jurisdiction risk. Understanding what's in the ground is essential before pricing the jurisdiction premium in the next section.

Metric	Barrick	AEM	NEM
P&P Gold Reserves	85M oz	55.4M oz (record)	Shrinking (by design)
Average Reserve Grade	0.98 g/t	1.30 g/t	Varies
M&I Gold Resources	200M oz	47.1M oz (record)	N/A (divesting)
Inferred Resources	—	41.8M oz (record)	N/A
Reserves in Safe Jurisdictions	Partial (Mali resolved, but Pakistan/Zambia)	100%	Partial
Key Growth Asset	Reko Diq (Pakistan) + Fourmile (Nevada)	Odyssey + Hope Bay + Detour UG	Post-divestiture focus
Largest Single Asset	NGM (61.5% JV)	Detour Lake (19.1M oz)	Peñasquito (38% of segment sales)

The reserve picture has shifted. Barrick's reserves declined from 89 million to 85 million ounces in FY2025, reflecting depletion and divestitures (Hemlo, Tongon, Donlin, and Alturas were all sold). But quality is improving: Fourmile in Nevada — where resources doubled to 2.6 million indicated ounces at 17.59 g/t — is one of the highest-grade undeveloped gold deposits in the world.

AEM's record 55.4 million ounces (up 2.1% year-over-year after replacing 3.0 million ounces mined) are entirely in jurisdictions where mine seizure risk is effectively zero. Detour Lake alone holds 19.1 million ounces with a mine life measured in decades. The Odyssey underground project extends Canadian Malartic's life. The Marban acquisition added 1.58 million ounces in initial probable reserves. At 1.30 g/t average grade, AEM's reserves are 33% richer than Barrick's 0.98 g/t — meaning AEM moves less rock per ounce.

NEM's reserves are intentionally shrinking. The divestiture program sold reserves along with mines — the trade-off of "shrink to improve ROIC." Fewer ounces, but higher-quality ounces in a concentrated portfolio.

Barrick's copper reserves (18 million tonnes at 0.46%) are a separate pillar — Reko Diq alone could make Barrick a top-10 copper producer. But the gold reserve decline (-4M oz year-over-year) shows even the largest base is depleting faster than it's being replaced.

Key takeaway: Barrick has the most ounces (85M), AEM has the highest-grade reserves (1.30 g/t) in the safest jurisdictions. The market prices this: $850/oz for AEM reserves vs $365/oz for Barrick.

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The Jurisdiction Price Tag

Investors pay a measurable premium for gold production in politically stable countries. We computed enterprise value per production ounce and per reserve ounce to quantify this premium.

Metric	AEM	Barrick	NEM
Market Cap (est.)	~$50B	~$38B	~$93B
Enterprise Value	~$47B	~$31B	~$92B
EV per production oz	$13,700	$9,500	$16,800
EV per reserve oz	$850	$365	N/A
Jurisdiction premium vs B	+44% (per prod. oz)	Baseline	+77%

Enterprise value note: EV computed as market cap plus net debt. NEM: $92.7B market cap + (-$492M net cash) = $92.2B. B: ~$38B market cap + (-$6.71B net cash) ≈ $31B. AEM: ~$50B market cap + (-$2.67B net cash) ≈ $47B. Market caps are approximate as of early February 2026. Both AEM and Barrick strengthened their balance sheets dramatically in FY2025 — AEM's net cash position reached $2,670M ($2,866M cash - $196M debt), while Barrick's reached $6.71B.

Investors pay 44% more per ounce of AEM production than Barrick, and over 130% more per reserve ounce ($850 vs $365). AEM's per-reserve-ounce premium narrowed from the prior update due to AEM's record reserve base (55.4M oz, up from ~43M), but the production-ounce premium remains substantial. The Mali crisis has been resolved, but the jurisdiction discount persists — reflecting Barrick's continued exposure to Pakistan and Zambia, plus its higher cost structure ($1,637/oz vs $1,339/oz AISC).

What Barrick's Mali Crisis Actually Cost

Mali's military government seized operational control of Loulo-Gounkoto — Barrick's second-largest gold mining complex — on June 16, 2025. The Bamako Commercial Tribunal placed the complex under temporary provisional administration, transferring operational control to a court-appointed administrator.

The crisis was resolved six months later. Barrick paid a settlement to the Government of Mali in November 2025 and regained control of Loulo-Gounkoto on December 16, 2025. The total cost of the crisis:

Mali Crisis Cost	Value
Production lost (~6 months at 580K oz/yr)	~290,000 oz
Foregone margin (~290K oz × $1,163/oz)	~$337M
Settlement payment (Nov 2025)	~$430M
Book value impairment (Q4 2024)	$484M
Total estimated cost	~$1.25B

The crisis is over, but the lesson stands. A single court ruling rendered 15% of Barrick's gold production inaccessible for six months. The $1.25 billion total cost is the quantified price of emerging-market jurisdiction risk. Barrick is now deploying capital into Reko Diq (Pakistan) and Lumwana (Zambia) — jurisdictions where similar risks exist.

Key takeaway: Investors pay $850/oz for AEM reserves in safe jurisdictions vs $365/oz for Barrick — a 133% premium. The Mali crisis quantified why: $1.25B in losses from a single mine disruption.

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Newmont's ROIC: The Honest Story

Newmont is the only company of the three where we can compute ROIC from SEC XBRL filings. Barrick and AEM file as Foreign Private Issuers (40-F), and our XBRL pipeline has systematic extraction issues with their filings (depreciation and capital expenditure fields map to zero, corrupting all derived metrics). We present NEM's ROIC with full context rather than comparing it to unverifiable estimates for the other two.

NEM ROIC Trend (from MetricDuck pipeline, 4 quarters):

Quarter	Revenue (q)	ROIC (q)	ROIC (TTM)	8Q Median	20Q Median	8Q StDev
Q4 2024	$5,652M	13.5%	8.3%	3.6%	4.3%	15.6%
Q1 2025	$5,010M	17.2%	12.2%	5.1%	5.6%	16.7%
Q2 2025	$5,317M	19.1%	15.1%	8.0%	5.6%	17.7%
Q3 2025	$5,524M	16.9%	17.4%	10.8%	5.6%	18.3%

What This Table Actually Shows

Q2 2025 was the ROIC peak. Quarterly ROIC hit 19.1% in Q2, then declined to 16.9% in Q3 despite revenue increasing from $5,317M to $5,524M. The easy gains from the initial divestitures and gold price surge may be plateauing.

The divestiture strategy creates genuine value — but not for the reason most assume. Q1 2025 had the lowest revenue ($5,010M) but the second-highest ROIC (17.2%) — higher than Q4 2024's $5,652M revenue at 13.5%. This is the mechanism: by divesting low-return assets, NEM shrinks its capital base. Smaller denominator, similar numerator, higher ROIC. The math works even when revenue declines.

But the 20-quarter median tells a different story. At 5.6%, NEM's long-term capital efficiency is mediocre. The metric barely moved across four quarters (4.3% → 5.6%), meaning the current 16.9% is a cyclical spike, not a structural improvement. Gold prices are doing most of the work.

The 8-quarter standard deviation is 18.3 percentage points. This is enormous volatility. NEM's current ROIC is within one standard deviation of its long-term median — not statistically anomalous. NEM's P/E of 50.5x confirms the market doesn't price in 16.9% as sustainable.

TTM ROIC (17.4%) is still rising even though the quarterly figure peaked. This lag effect is mechanical: the trailing twelve months still includes the strong Q1-Q3 period. TTM will likely peak in Q4 2025 or Q1 2026.

Divestiture gains inflate the numbers. NEM recognized $1.1 billion in gains on sales of non-core assets in the first nine months of 2025. These gains flow through operating income and inflate ROIC. Strip them out, and the underlying improvement is more modest.

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What This Analysis Cannot Tell You

We present the data honestly, which means flagging what it doesn't show:

1. NEM's AISC is estimated, not verified. Our ~$1,500/oz figure is derived from cost of applicable sales and estimated production. NEM produces multiple metals, making gold-specific AISC estimation imprecise. The company will report actual AISC on February 19.

2. We cannot compute ROIC for Barrick or AEM. Both file as Foreign Private Issuers (40-F/6-K). Our XBRL pipeline has systematic extraction issues: depreciation maps to zero, capital expenditures map to zero, and free cash flow equals operating cash flow. This corrupts all capital efficiency metrics. We chose to present NEM's pipeline data honestly rather than publish unverifiable estimates for the other two.

3. Filing dates are not synchronized. NEM data is from Q3 2025 (September 30, 2025). Barrick and AEM data are both from FY2025 6-K filings (December 31, 2025), providing a time-matched comparison. The AISC comparison between Barrick ($1,637/oz) and AEM ($1,339/oz) reflects the same gold price environment — the $298/oz gap is structural, not a timing artifact. NEM reports FY2025 results on February 19, which will complete the time-matched comparison.

4. NEM's production is back-calculated. NEM's ~5.5 million ounce production estimate comes from revenue divided by estimated average realized gold prices. NEM also produces significant silver, copper, zinc, and lead — meaning the gold production estimate may be imprecise.

5. Divestiture gains inflate NEM's current profitability. The $1.1 billion in gains on asset sales during 2025 are one-time events. They improve ROIC, net income, and operating margins — but they are not repeatable. Post-divestiture, NEM's earnings quality will depend on the retained portfolio's organic performance.

6. Gold at $2,800 flatters everyone. All three companies look strong at record gold prices. The analytical question is not current profitability — it's what happens at $2,000 or $1,500. The margin sensitivity table in the Cost Curve section is more useful than any single-point metric.

7. Inflationary pressures are accelerating. NEM's 10-Q notes that increased costs specific to labor, materials, consumables and fuel and energy remain a key consideration. This affects all three companies and could erode the AISC advantage at any gold price.

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The Three Bets

Each company is making a fundamentally different wager with record cash flows. The right answer depends on where gold goes.

NEM bets gold has peaked. Deleverage now, return capital, optimize the retained portfolio. If gold falls to $2,000, NEM is the safest — it already shed the non-core assets, retired $3.9 billion in debt, and moved to net cash. If gold stays above $2,800, NEM left money on the table by divesting producing mines at what may have been the right time.

Barrick bets on diversification. Copper growth, a North American gold IPO, and balanced returns. The copper thesis is a hedge against gold price reversion — if gold falls but copper rises (driven by electrification demand), Barrick's 220,000-tonne copper production provides a buffer. But execution risk is real: Reko Diq in Pakistan is under security review, and 2026 AISC guidance of $1,760-$1,950/oz leaves thin margin at lower gold prices.

AEM bets on organic gold growth. Lowest cost, safest jurisdictions, biggest capex into underground mines. If gold stays above $2,000, AEM's $661/oz margin cushion and pipeline of 20-30% production growth compounds over the next decade. Below $1,500, even AEM's cost advantage gets thin — $161/oz is survivable but doesn't fund the growth projects.

The margin sensitivity table in the Cost Curve section shows exactly where each strategy breaks. That is the most useful single table in this analysis.

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Earnings Updates and Watchlist

Barrick FY2025 Results — February 5, 2026 (Updated)

Barrick's FY2025 6-K filed February 5, 2026 delivered several surprises:

1. AISC rose to $1,637/oz (above $1,222-1,335 guidance) — higher royalties from elevated gold prices drove the increase. 2026 guidance is $1,760-1,950/oz assuming $4,500 gold.
2. Mali crisis resolved: Settlement paid November 2025, operational control regained December 16, 2025. Total estimated cost: ~$1.25B (foregone margin + settlement + impairment).
3. Record shareholder returns: $2.39B total ($1.5B buybacks + $0.89B dividends). New quarterly dividend of $0.175/share with 50% FCF payout target.
4. FCF nearly tripled to $3.87B on $16.96B revenue. Cash balance reached $6.71B (+65%).
5. CEO transition: Mark Hill replaced Mark Bristow (September 2025), bringing a shift toward balanced capital allocation.
6. North American gold IPO: Board authorized preparations for late-2026 IPO of Nevada Gold Mines, Pueblo Viejo, and Fourmile assets.
7. Reko Diq caution: Management reviewing project due to increased security incidents in the region.
8. Reserves declined from 89M to 85M oz, but Fourmile resources doubled to 2.6M oz indicated at 17.59 g/t.

AEM FY2025 Results — February 13, 2026 (Updated)

AEM's FY2025 6-K filed February 13, 2026 delivered record results across nearly every metric:

1. AISC rose to $1,339/oz (above $1,250-1,300 guidance) — approximately $42/oz of the increase reflects higher royalties at an average realized gold price of $3,453, well above the $2,500 assumption in guidance. 2026 guidance is $1,400-1,550/oz.
2. Production of 3,447,367 oz — above midpoint of 3.30-3.50M guidance. Three-year production guidance of 3.3-3.5M oz annually through 2028.
3. Record free cash flow of $4,399M ($8.76/share) on record operating cash flow of $6,817M. Q4 FCF alone was $1,310M.
4. Net cash surged to $2,670M ($2,866M cash - $196M debt). Long-term debt reduced by $400M in Q3. Moody's upgraded credit rating to A3 Stable.
5. Shareholder returns of $1.4B — $600M in share buybacks (4.1M shares at avg $145.76) plus $803M in dividends. Quarterly dividend increased 12.5% to $0.45/share.
6. Record reserves of 55.4M oz at 1.30 g/t (up 2.1%), replacing 3.0M mined ounces plus Marban acquisition (1.58M oz). M&I resources record at 47.1M oz.
7. Odyssey ahead of schedule — East Gouldie production from ramp Q1 2026, from shaft Q2 2027. Evaluating second shaft. Hope Bay construction decision expected Q2 2026.
8. Growth vision: 20-30% production increase over next decade, exceeding 4M oz by early 2030s. Avenir Minerals established for critical mineral assets.
9. Tariff risk flagged as key uncertainty — trade disputes between US and Canada could impact supply chains and input costs.

NEM Q4/FY2025 Earnings — February 19, 2026

1. FY2025 AISC: The first confirmed figure. Our estimate was ~$1,400-1,600/oz. This determines NEM's actual position on the cost curve.
2. Q4 ROIC trajectory: Did ROIC continue declining from Q2's peak (19.1%) and Q3 (16.9%)? Or did Q4 stabilize?
3. Divestiture completion: Were all six non-core assets sold? Total proceeds? Remaining assets?
4. Net debt position: Was net cash maintained (was -$492M at Q3)? Additional debt retired in Q4?
5. 2026 production guidance: Post-divestiture, how much has NEM's production footprint shrunk?
6. Peñasquito concentration: At 38% of segment sales, any operational issues at Peñasquito are material.
7. Yanacocha status: Filing intelligence noted the company was "exploring legal alternatives including liquidation." Any resolution?

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Explore the Data

The financial data analyzed in this research powers MetricDuck's company analysis platform. Explore earnings, ROIC, and filing intelligence for each gold producer:

• Newmont (NEM) Earnings | ROIC | Filing Intelligence | Analysis
• Barrick (B) Earnings | Filing Intelligence | Analysis
• Agnico Eagle (AEM) Earnings | Filing Intelligence | Analysis

Related Research:

• FCX vs SCCO: Why the Largest Copper Miner Earns the Lowest ROIC — Copper mining ROIC comparison using the same XBRL pipeline

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Methodology and Dataset

ROIC Computation (NEM only): Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT) divided by Invested Capital, computed from XBRL financial facts processed by MetricDuck. NOPAT = Operating Income × (1 - Effective Tax Rate). Invested Capital = Total Assets - Current Liabilities (excluding short-term debt). All pipeline computations use standardized formulas.

AISC Data: All-In Sustaining Cost figures are extracted from company filings (6-K for both AEM and Barrick FY2025, 10-Q/10-K for NEM). AISC is a non-GAAP metric defined by the World Gold Council and is not available in standardized XBRL format. AEM mine-by-mine AISC from FY2024 40-F (FY2025 mine-by-mine detail pending 40-F filing). AEM company-wide FY2025 AISC of $1,339/oz from FY2025 6-K. Barrick FY2025 AISC of $1,637/oz from FY2025 6-K. NEM AISC estimated from cost of applicable sales. Note: AISC includes royalties, which scale with gold prices — both AEM and Barrick saw AISC increases in FY2025 driven by higher royalties at elevated gold prices (AEM averaged $3,453/oz realized, Barrick ~$2,800/oz).

Enterprise Value: Computed as approximate market capitalization plus net debt. Market caps are approximate based on share prices and estimated shares outstanding as of early February 2026.

Filing Intelligence: Qualitative analysis (risk landscape, hidden liabilities, thesis summaries) from MetricDuck's filing intelligence processor, which uses structured prompts against full filing text.

40-F Pipeline Limitation: Barrick and AEM file as Foreign Private Issuers (40-F annually, 6-K interim). Our XBRL pipeline has extraction issues with these filings: depreciation and amortization, capital expenditures, and property/plant/equipment map to zero or incorrect values. This is a known pipeline limitation, not a data availability issue — the information exists in the filings but maps to different XBRL elements than the pipeline expects. We are working to resolve this.

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Disclaimer

This analysis is for educational and informational purposes only. It does not constitute investment advice, and you should not rely on it as such.

Important considerations:

• This is a research analysis of SEC filing data, not a recommendation to buy or sell any security
• NEM's AISC is estimated and may differ materially from the company-reported figure
• We cannot compute ROIC for Barrick or AEM due to pipeline limitations with 40-F filings — estimates from other sources are not verified
• NEM's current ROIC benefits from $1.1 billion in one-time divestiture gains that are not sustainable
• Mineral reserve estimates, production guidance, and capital expenditure projections are forward-looking statements from company filings and are subject to change
• Gold prices significantly affect all financial metrics presented here — this analysis reflects conditions at approximately $2,800/oz gold. AEM's average realized price was $3,453/oz in FY2025
• Enterprise values and per-ounce metrics use approximate market capitalizations and estimated production figures
• Always verify financial data against original SEC filings on EDGAR

Conflict of Interest Disclosure: MetricDuck provides financial analysis tools that process SEC XBRL filings. This research demonstrates our data capabilities and domain expertise.