We have 2 articles on "AEM" so far. More coming soon!
Gold hit $5,000 and both mining companies and royalty companies are printing record cash. But the SEC filings reveal that the conventional wisdom about miners' 2x leverage is wrong — it's only 1.18x. We analyzed four companies' filings to build a framework that shows exactly when each model wins, anchored to a single number: $2,750.
At $2,800+ gold, all three major gold miners are profitable. The question is what each does with the windfall. Newmont (NEM) is shrinking — divesting six non-core mines for $3.4 billion, retiring $3.9 billion in debt — and its quarterly ROIC peaked at 19.1% in Q2 2025 before declining to 16.9% in Q3. But NEM's 20-quarter median ROIC is 5.6%, and $1.1 billion in divestiture gains inflate current earnings. Agnico Eagle (AEM) produces gold at the industry's lowest all-in sustaining cost — $1,339/oz in FY2025, up $100/oz from FY2024 due to higher royalties — from mines concentrated in Canada, Australia, and Finland. AEM generated record free cash flow of $4.4 billion and grew reserves to a record 55.4 million ounces. Barrick (B) holds 85 million ounces in reserves but its AISC rose to $1,637/oz in FY2025 — making it unprofitable below $1,637 gold while AEM breaks even at $1,339. Barrick's Mali crisis was resolved in December 2025 after costing an estimated $1.25 billion. This analysis compares per-ounce economics, capital allocation strategies, and jurisdiction risk using SEC filing data.
High-bandwidth memory powers every AI accelerator from NVIDIA's H100 to AMD's MI300X—but the most revealing data about HBM supply geography doesn't appear in any chip maker's filing. It's in FormFactor's annual report, where a probe card geographic revenue table shows South Korea overtook the United States as the dominant buyer of HBM test equipment in 2025, adding $53 million while US revenues fell $32 million in a single year. This analysis cross-reads 135 operational SEC filings across four companies and three SIC codes—tracing HBM demand from process equipment through memory production, test infrastructure, and demand driver—to surface a supply chain concentration that no single 10-K can reveal.
Basel III endgame never became law, yet 419 substantive SEC filings prove it functioned as an operative market signal across three distinct industries simultaneously. Morgan Stanley's 10-K disclosed that its risk-weighted assets would rise 40% under the Expanded Approach—nearly three times State Street's 15%—while the G-SIB surcharge offset buried in that same filing contradicts the universal narrative that large trading banks faced unlimited capital pain. The real story emerges only from reading across the chain: bank capital constraints flow downstream through ICE's clearing infrastructure and into the Agency MBS market where mortgage REITs like Bimini Capital hold assets.
AI infrastructure capex has crossed from strategic investment into arms race. Amazon's FY 2025 10-K records $128.3 billion in capital expenditures — up 65% in a single year. Alphabet spent $91.4 billion, up 74%. Meta committed $115-135 billion for 2026 before a dollar has been spent. Reading all five filings together reveals three structural patterns investors are still underestimating: the spending is accelerating, not plateauing; Microsoft's reported margins already show the cost compression that peers only discuss in the future tense; and NVIDIA's own 10-K names the same data centers and power grids that hyperscalers are racing to build as the binding constraint on its revenue growth — completing a self-reinforcing cycle that no single filing captures alone.
On March 11, 2026, Stryker Corporation filed its first 8-K disclosing a cybersecurity incident that disrupted its global Microsoft environment — one of 916 material cybersecurity 8-K disclosures filed with the SEC in the past 12 months. But the initial 8-K is the least financially informative disclosure in the entire lifecycle. Cross-company analysis of four non-tech companies — a medical device maker, a donut chain, a mortgage lender, and a hospital system — reveals that the most financially specific SEC disclosures appear 12–24 months after the incident. Insurance recoveries of $21.5M to $35M, class action consolidations, and settlement disclosures mark the true cost — and they arrive long after the headlines fade.
Across 351 operational SEC filings, the lithium battery supply chain reveals a counter-intuitive pattern: falling lithium prices did not flow evenly through the value chain. Albemarle grew volumes 8% even as pricing collapsed $627 million. Rivian grew deliveries while flagging battery supply as a material risk. But Aspen Aerogels — the company whose thermal barriers physically protect lithium-ion batteries — lost 45% of its revenue despite holding multi-year OEM contracts. Mid-chain component suppliers absorbed the worst of the shock.
Data center power demand appears in 404 SEC filings across 30+ companies and 15 industries, but the most important pattern isn't the breadth — it's the convergence. Bitcoin miners are becoming data center landlords. Solar infrastructure companies are rewiring for server racks. A semiconductor firm cut 19% of its workforce to chase power conversion chips. From opposite ends of the value chain, companies that historically had nothing to do with computing are reorganizing around a single commodity: electricity access.